A Warrior’s Wisdom

In an 1879 speech at a military academy, General William Tecumseh Sherman famously said, “War is Hell.” He was right. War is also hard.  

With the U.S. mired in a costly standoff with Iran in Mr. Trump’s war-of-choice, its time to consider how to win a war as seen through the eyes of one of America’s most respected senior officers of World War II, Admiral Raymond Spruance (pictured). His first great success was as commander of a carrier task force that, thanks to Navy intelligence officers who broke the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) code, ambushed Japan’s carrier force attacking the U.S. airbase on Midway Atoll northwest of Hawaii on June 4, 1942. Spruance’s airmen sank all four IJN carriers with the loss of all their planes and many of their best pilots. It was a turning point of the war.

During the war’s last years, Spruance was commander of the Navy’s Fifth Fleet in the Pacific. The Fleet was built around more than a dozen new, fast Essex-class aircraft carriers and included lighter carriers, fast battleships, and hundreds of other combat ships. He was responsible for defeating Japan’s powerful navy, protecting amphibious landings on Japanese-held islands across the central Pacific to the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, and for the innovative fuel and supplies fleet that allowed hundreds of warships to stay at sea for long periods. 

In addition to Midway, Spruance’s greatest victory was the Battle of the Philippine Sea in late June 1944. In two days, his carrier planes destroyed more than 550 Japanese aircraft with nearly all their crews; U.S. losses were 123 (80 of which ran out of gas after dark and ditched in the water, but 75% of their crews were rescued). While the air battle raged above, U.S. submarines sank the two largest IJN carriers. After its Philippine Sea losses, the IJN’s once-superior air power was no longer a factor.

After the war, Spruance, known for his calm under pressure and his razor-sharp intellect, was appointed president of the U.S. Naval War College. He immediately set about developing a new curriculum to enable senior officers to better fight future wars. 

Naval War College courses now stressed the importance of reliable intelligence, thorough knowledge of  international affairs including the foreign policies of the U.S. and other influential countries, and knowledge of new technologies and their likely long-term evolutions. Courses also emphasized orderly thinking and planning and cooperation among the several military branches and the State and Defense Departments. To expand senior officer’s horizons beyond technical aspects of seamanship, Spruance brought in experts from universities and defense industries as visiting lecturers.

Spruance’s liberal education curriculum was intended to make the Navy’s leaders better informed citizens and “to get the best brains we can get.” Academic freedom was fundamental: there wasn’t a single “right answer” to a problem. Students were expected to think for themselves regardless of rank and were expected to have open minds receptive to the views of others. The College was no place for know-it-alls.

Contrast the Admiral’s approach to that of the current political regime’s attack on Iran where orderly thinking and planning was so lacking that the goal was unclear and an exit strategy nonexistent. Spruance’s approach was for professional military leaders, but we should expect civilian leaders who set military policy to share versions of the same qualities. Instead, too many lack a deep knowledge of world affairs, academic freedom in schools and universities is criticized, thinking for oneself is replaced by simple loyalty to one man, and expertise replaced by that man’s “instinct.” Admiral Spruance would be concerned for the future of the country he did so much to protect.